Backgound
The escalating confrontation between Israel, the United States, and Iran marks a critical turning point in Middle Eastern geopolitics. The death of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei on the first day of the war briefly ignited hope inside and outside Iran that a generational shift might open the door to a more moderate political future. But that hope dimmed quickly. The regime moved with striking speed to name his son, Mojtaba Khamenei, as successor, a figure widely believed to hold views even more hardline than his father’s. What followed was not a moment of national reset but a tightening of old patterns.
Inside the political elite, the war acted like a harsh light. Rivalries that had simmered for years suddenly sharpened, and long-standing debates about Iran’s strategic direction resurfaced with new urgency. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and its hardline allies seized the moment, framing the conflict as proof that their warnings about the United States had always been justified. For them, the war was not just a geopolitical crisis but it was a proof of a narrative they had been preparing for decades. On the other side stood the pragmatists, aligned with figures such as former President Hassan Rouhani and the technocratic wing of the state. They struggled to defend a vision of diplomacy that now felt painfully out of reach. Similarly, the traditional conservatives around the parliament and the Guardian Council tried to cast themselves as guardians of stability. Yet behind closed doors, they are aware that the political center of gravity was shifting away from them and toward the security establishment.
Even within the clerical hierarchy among the Qom seminaries (often described as the Vatican of Shi’ism), and senior Ayatollahs, there is a subdued recognition that the balance of power is tilting decisively toward the IRGC, which is structured to preserve continuity even after leadership losses. The war has not resolved Iran’s factional tensions but it has merely rearranged them, pushing moderates and reformists further to the margins while pulling IRGC aligned hardliners into the heart of decision-making. What emerges from this moment is a political system under extraordinary internal pressure, its elite strained by fear, ambition, and uncertainty.
And yet, Iran’s history complicates any expectation of collapse. The state has repeatedly absorbed external pressure sanctions, isolation, covert attacks and used it to reinforce its own narrative of resistance. This resilience makes externally imposed regime change, especially one driven by the United States and Israel, a distant prospect. If regime change is unlikely, the question becomes unavoidable: what endgame are the U.S. and Israel actually pursuing?
For more than two decades, Israel has viewed Iran’s nuclear ambitions and expanding regional influence as existential threats. Its strategic doctrine has emphasized preventive action, i.e., neutralizing adversaries before their capabilities mature. This logic echoes earlier strikes on nuclear facilities in Iraq (1981), Syria (2007), and Iran (2025). The current campaign follows the same pattern, targeting nuclear infrastructure, missile sites, and command structures. Again, history offers a sobering warning that tactical success rarely produces strategic clarity. Degrading an adversary’s military capabilities does not automatically yield political stability or a durable regional order. Weakened states often adapt rather than collapse, and their adaptations can reshape the region in unpredictable ways. The Middle East is full of such lessons. The 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq removed Saddam Hussein but created a power vacuum that fueled insurgency, sectarian conflict, and eventually the rise of ISIS. The 2011 NATO intervention in Libya toppled Muammar Gaddafi but left behind fragmented authority and proliferating militias. These cases reinforce a central realist insight, weakening a state rarely produces a stable regional equilibrium. More often, it generates security vacuums that invite new competition. Even a severely weakened Iran could remain a source of instability, shifting toward indirect and asymmetric strategies of resistance. Understanding this moment requires not only strategic analysis but also attention to the human consequences of war the displacement, economic disruption, and insecurity that ripple far beyond the battlefield.
This historical lens is essential for interpreting the current conflict, and for understanding why the region stands at such a precarious crossroads.
Balance of Power, Proxy Dynamics, Regional Order and Gulf Strategic Reactions
To understand the strategic implications of the war, it must be situated within the broader balance of power dynamics of the Middle East. The regional order has long been characterized by a resistance to hegemonic dominance, with Israel, Iran, Turkey, and the Gulf monarchies operating as competing poles of power. Iran’s strategy focusing on missile development, nuclear advancement, and alliances with non- state actors has been designed to counterbalance Israeli and American power. Israel’s current campaign seeks to alter this balance by weakening Iran’s military capability. But balance of power theory suggests that weakened states rarely accept subordination rather to adapt. This is where Iran’s proxy network becomes central to its survival strategy and has become one of its most significant strategic adaptations. Hezbollah, the Houthis, Iraqi Shi’a militias, and remnants of Hamas form a decentralized “Axis of Resistance” capable of projecting influence across multiple theaters. This network enables Iran to exert power even when its conventional military capacity is constrained. It also helps explain why these groups have remained relatively restrained in the early stages of the conflict whereas Tehran is calibrating escalation carefully, not abandoning it. Proxy dynamics are not static they are political instruments shaped by Iran’s internal calculations, regional pressures, and global diplomatic signals.
The United States has publicly signaled caution regarding any large-scale ground attack, emphasizing the risks of regional escalation and the difficulty of sustaining such an operation across vast geographic distance. Washington’s position reflects a broader strategic assessment that airstrikes alone rarely compel regime collapse, yet a ground invasion would carry enormous political, military, and humanitarian costs. Iran’s population size, territorial depth, and history of absorbing external pressure further insulate it from externally imposed regime change. These realities push the conflict into domains where Iran has long experience and strategic patience of asymmetric warfare, diplomatic maneuvering, and economic pressure. In this environment, proxy forces become even more central not only as tools of deterrence and retaliation, but as mechanisms through which Iran can shape outcomes without inviting direct confrontation.
Iran’s position near the Strait of Hormuz one of the world’s most critical energy chokepoints gives it leverage over global energy flows. Roughly 20 percent of global petroleum consumption passes through this narrow corridor and any disruption there would reverberate across global markets. The diplomatic moves by France and Italy to engage Iran regarding safe passage through the Strait of Hormuz reveal the gowing concern among European states about the immediate economic consequences of the conflict. Washington’s 30-day relaxation of sanctions on Russian oil shipments reflects a pragmatic response to immediate market pressures which is seen by the raising prices, affecting fertilizer production, and increasing food costs worldwide. This is why the conflict cannot be understood solely as a regional issue.
It is a global economic risk and these economic risks ensure that the conflict extends far beyond regional politics and directly affects global economic stability and humanitarian crisis. Against this background, the Gulf states face a profound strategic dilemma of putting Iran as rival.
Having said that, Gulf states’ positions toward Israel and the United States further complicate their strategic calculus. While the Abraham Accords opened unprecedented avenues for cooperation, the ongoing conflict has strained public opinion across the Gulf and forced governments to balance strategic interests with domestic sensitivities. States like the UAE and Bahrain continue to value economic and technological partnerships with Israel, but they are wary of appearing complicit in policies that inflame regional tensions or provoke Iranian retaliation. Saudi Arabia, which had been moving cautiously toward normalization, has slowed the pace but not abandoning the idea, but recalibrating it in light of the conflict’s political and security risks. Their security architectures remain deeply intertwined with Washington, and U.S. military presence in the Gulf is still viewed as the primary external deterrent against Iranian aggression.
Yet Gulf governments are increasingly cautious about being drawn into a U.S.– Iran confrontation that they do not control. Looking back to the Biden administration’s emphasis on preventing regional escalation and its clear reluctance to support or participate in any large‑scale ground campaign against Iran remains highly relevant to the current conflict. Washington’s priority has been containment: protecting U.S. forces, deterring Iranian proxies, and preventing the war from expanding into a full regional confrontation. This posture aligns closely with Gulf states’ desire for stability, but it also reinforces a long‑standing perception that the United States is recalibrating its regional commitments. The Gulf sees a pattern: reduced U.S. appetite for major military interventions, a shift toward burden‑sharing, and a growing focus on strategic competition with China.
This uncertainty pushes Gulf states to hedge more aggressively to maintain deep security ties with Washington because the U.S. remains the only actor capable of providing credible military deterrence against Iran while expanding diplomatic and economic channels with Tehran to reduce the risk of direct retaliation. They are also strengthening ties with Beijing and Moscow not as replacements for the U.S., but as additional pillars in a more diversified foreign‑policy strategy. China’s role as a top energy customer and mediator, and Russia’s role in OPEC+ coordination since 2016 give both countries influence over Gulf states. In this environment, Gulf governments are not simply reacting to U.S. policy, they are actively shaping a multipolar strategy designed to protect their economies and avoid entanglement in a prolonged U.S.–Iran confrontation. Their hedging is not a sign of abandoning Washington, but a pragmatic response to a shifting geopolitical landscape in which no single power can guarantee long‑term stability.
For Gulf leaders, the priority is not choosing sides between Israel and Iran, or between Washington and Tehran, but preventing a regional war that could destabilize their economies, threaten energy infrastructure, and undermine their long-term development agendas. Their approach is therefore pragmatic: support U.S. deterrence but avoid escalation; maintain quiet ties with Israel but push for de-escalation; and keep diplomatic channels with Iran open to reduce the likelihood of miscalculation. In this environment, Gulf states are not passive observers rather they are active managers of risk, seeking to shape a regional order that protects their economic futures rather than entangles them in prolonged confrontation.
Policy Implication
The war has exposed the fragility of the Middle East’s political architecture, where weakened states adapt in unpredictable ways, proxy networks gain strategic weight, and global powers compete for influence without assuming responsibility for stability. Ordinary people from Tehran to Tel Aviv, from Riyadh to Beirut are the ones who bear the cost of strategic miscalculation. They live with the inflation, the displacement, the fear of escalation, and the erosion of trust in institutions. Their lives remind us that the pursuit of security through force often generates new cycles of insecurity, a paradox at the heart of the region’s modern history. For the United states, the challenge was maintaining deterrence without becoming entangled in another protracted conflict. Securing maritime routes and preventing proxy escalation will be central. However, there is seemingly a shift that the US has moved from regime change towards a decapitation and fragmentation strategy by eliminating and targeting key decision-makers in Iran in order to disrupt coordination and weaken the regime’s control apparatus. Israel seeks to neutralize what it sees as an existential threat.
Gulf states will prioritize stability, infrastructure protection, hedging and balancing security ties with Washington, quiet diplomacy with Tehran, and growing economic links with Beijing. Europe, haunted by past crises, is pushing for de‑escalation, diplomatic initiatives and nuclear negotiations to avoid another wave of displacement, refuge flows and economic shock. The policy landscape is therefore shaped by overlapping but not identical priorities: deterrence for the U.S., stability for the Gulf, and de-escalation for Europe.
Yet Iran’s history of absorbing pressure reminds us that collapse is not the most likely outcome rather adaptation is. Understanding this moment requires seeing both the strategic landscape and the human terrain beneath it. The pursuit of security through power often generates new forms of insecurity that is a paradox the world has now witnessed at the heart of Middle Eastern geopolitics. Hence, long-term stability will require more than deterrence. It will require diplomacy, economic cooperation, and a recognition that security cannot be imposed by force alone.
References
Byman, D. (2018). Iran’s Proxy Wars in the Middle East. Brookings Institution.
Dodge, T. (2012). Iraq: From War to a New Authoritarianism. Routledge.
Gause, F. G. (2014). The International Relations of the Persian Gulf. Cambridge University Press. International Energy Agency (IEA). (2019). Impact of Drone and Missile Attacks on Saudi Oil Production. Mearsheimer, J. (2001). The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. W.W. Norton.
Walt, S. (1987). The Origins of Alliances. Cornell University Press.
Wehrey, F. (2018). Sectarian Politics in the Gulf: From Iraq to Syria. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
By Seble Getachew (Ms.)
